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RECURSIVE CONCURRENT STOCHASTIC GAMES

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ABSTRACT. We study Recursive Concurrent Stochastic Games (RCSGs), extending our recent analysis of recursive simple stochastic games [16, 17] to a concurrent setting where the two players choose moves simultaneously and independently at each state. For multi-exit games, our earlier work already showed undecidability for basic questions like termination, thus we focus on the important case of single-exit RCSGs (1-RCSGs).

We first characterize the value of a 1-RCSG termination game as the least fixed point solution of a system of nonlinear minimax functional equations, and use it to show PSPACE decidability for the quantitative termination problem. We then give a strategy improvement technique, which we use to show that player 1 (maximizer) has ϵ -optimal randomized Stackless & Memoryless (r-SM) strategies for all $\epsilon > 0$, while player 2 (minimizer) has optimal r-SM strategies. Thus, such games are r-SM-determined. These results mirror and generalize in a strong sense the randomized memoryless determinacy results for finite stochastic games, and extend the classic Hoffman-Karp [22] strategy improvement approach from the finite to an infinite state setting. The proofs in our infinite-state setting are very different however, relying on subtle analytic properties of certain power series that arise from studying 1-RCSGs.

We show that our upper bounds, even for qualitative (probability 1) termination, can not be improved, even to NP, without a major breakthrough, by giving two reductions: first a P-time reduction from the long-standing square-root sum problem to the quantitative termination decision problem for *finite* concurrent stochastic games, and then a P-time reduction from the latter problem to the qualitative termination problem for 1-RCSGs.

1. INTRODUCTION

In recent work we have studied Recursive Markov Decision Processes (RMDPs) and turn-based Recursive Simple Stochastic Games (RSSGs) ([16, 17]), providing a number of strong upper and lower bounds for their analysis. These define infinite-state (perfect information) stochastic games that extend Recursive Markov Chains (RMCs) ([14, 15]) with non-probabilistic actions controlled by players. Here we extend our study to Recursive Concurrent Stochastic Games (RCSGs), where the two players choose moves simultaneously and independently at each state, unlike RSSGs where only one player can move at each state.

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RCSGs define a class of infinite-state zero-sum (imperfect information) stochastic games that can naturally model probabilistic procedural programs and other systems involving both recursive and probabilistic behavior, as well as concurrent interactions between the system and the environment. Informally, all such recursive models consist of a finite collection of finite state component models (of the same type) that can call each other in a potentially recursive manner. For RMDPs and RSSGs with multiple exits (terminating states), our earlier work already showed that basic questions such as almost sure termination (i.e. does player 1 have a strategy that ensures termination with probability 1) are already undecidable; on the other hand, we gave strong upper bounds for the important special case of *single-exit* RMDPs and RSSGs (called 1-RMDPs and 1-RSSGs).

Our focus in this paper is thus on single-exit Recursive Concurrent Stochastic Games (1-RCSGs for short). These models correspond to a concurrent game version of multi-type *Branching Processes* and *Stochastic Context-Free Grammars*, both of which are important and extensively studied stochastic processes with many applications including in population genetics, nuclear chain reactions, computational biology, and natural language processing (see, e.g., [21, 23, 24] and other references in [14, 16]). It is very natural to consider game extensions to these stochastic models. Branching processes model the growth of a population of entities of distinct types. In each generation each entity of a given type gives rise, according to a probability distribution, to a multi-set of entities of distinct types. A branching process can be mapped to a 1-exit Recursive Markov Chain (1-RMC) such that the probability of eventual extinction of a species is equal to the probability of termination in the 1-RMC. Modeling the process in a context where external agents can influence the evolution to bias it towards extinction or towards survival leads naturally to a game. A 1-RCSG models the process where the evolution of some types is affected by the concurrent actions of external favorable and unfavorable agents (forces).

In [16], we showed that for the turned-based 1-RSSG termination game, where the goal of player 1 (respectively, player 2) is to maximize (resp. minimize) the probability of termination starting at a given vertex (in the empty calling context), we can decide in PSPACE whether the value of the game is $\geq p$ for a given probability p , and we can approximate this value (which can be irrational) to within given precision with the same complexity. We also showed that both players have optimal *deterministic Stackless and Memoryless* (SM) strategies in the 1-RSSG termination game; these are strategies that depend neither on the history of the game nor on the call stack at the current state. Thus from each vertex belonging to the player, such a strategy deterministically picks one of the outgoing transitions.

Already for finite-state concurrent stochastic games (CSGs), even under the simple termination objective, the situation is rather different. Memoryless strategies do suffice for both players, but randomization of strategies is necessary, meaning we can't hope for deterministic ϵ -optimal strategies for either player. Moreover, player 1 (the maximizer) can only attain ϵ -optimal strategies, for $\epsilon > 0$, whereas player 2 (the minimizer) does have optimal randomized memoryless strategies (see, e.g., [19, 12]). Another important result for finite CSGs is the classic Hoffman-Karp [22] strategy improvement method, which provides, via simple local improvements, a sequence of randomized memoryless strategies which yield payoffs that converge to the value of the game.

Here we generalize all these results to the infinite-state setting of 1-RCSG termination games. We first characterize values of the 1-RCSG termination game as the least fixed point solution of a system of nonlinear minimax functional equations. We use this to show

PSPACE decidability for the *qualitative termination problem* (is the value of the game $= 1$?) and the *quantitative termination problem* (is the value of the game $\geq r$ (or $\leq r$, etc.), for given rational r), as well as PSPACE algorithms for approximating the termination probabilities of 1-RCSGs to within a given number of bits of precision, via results for the existential theory of reals. (The simpler “qualitative problem” of deciding whether the game value is $= 0$ only depends on the transition structure of the 1-RCSG and not on the specific probabilities. For this problem we give a polynomial time algorithm.)

We then proceed to our technically most involved result, a strategy improvement technique for 1-RCSG termination games. We use this to show that in these games player 1 (maximizer) has ϵ -optimal randomized-Stackless & Memoryless (r-SM for short) strategies, whereas player 2 (minimizer) has optimal r-SM strategies. Thus, such games are r-SM-determined. These results mirror and generalize in a very strong sense the randomized memoryless determinacy results known for finite stochastic games. Our technique extends Hoffman-Karp’s strategy improvement method for finite CSGs to an infinite state setting. However, the proofs in our infinite-state setting are very different. We rely on subtle analytic properties of certain power series that arise from studying 1-RCSGs.

Note that our PSPACE upper bounds for the quantitative termination problem for 1-RCSGs can not be improved to NP without a major breakthrough, since already for 1-RMCs we showed in [14] that the quantitative termination problem is at least as hard as the square-root sum problem (see [14]). In fact, here we show that even the *qualitative termination problem* for 1-RCSGs, where the problem is to decide whether the value of the game is exactly 1, is already as hard as the square-root sum problem, and moreover, so is the quantitative termination decision problem for *finite* CSGs. We do this via two reductions: we give a P-time reduction from the square-root sum problem to the quantitative termination decision problem for *finite* CSGs, and a P-time reduction from the quantitative finite CSG termination problem to the qualitative 1-RCSG termination problem.

It is known ([6]) that for finite concurrent games, probabilistic nodes do not add any power to these games, because the stochastic nature of the games can in fact be simulated by concurrency alone. The same is true for 1-RCSGs. Specifically, given a finite CSG (or 1-RCSG), G , there is a P-time reduction to a finite concurrent game (or 1-RCG, respectively) $F(G)$, without any probabilistic vertices, such that the value of the game G is exactly the same as the value of the game $F(G)$. We will provide a proof of this in Section 2 for completeness.

Related work. Stochastic games go back to Shapley [28], who considered finite concurrent stochastic games with (discounted) rewards. See, e.g., [19] for a recent book on stochastic games. Turn-based “simple” finite stochastic games were studied by Condon [10]. As mentioned, we studied RMDPs and (turn-based) RSSGs and their quantitative and qualitative termination problems in [16, 17]. In [17] we showed that the qualitative termination problem for both maximizing and minimizing 1-RMDPs is in P, and for 1-RSSGs is in $\text{NP} \cap \text{coNP}$. Our earlier work [14, 15] developed theory and algorithms for Recursive Markov Chains (RMCs), and [13, 3] have studied probabilistic Pushdown Systems which are essentially equivalent to RMCs.

Finite-state concurrent stochastic games have been studied extensively in recent CS literature (see, e.g., [7, 12, 11]). In particular, the papers [8] and [7] have studied, for finite CSGs, the *approximate* reachability problem and *approximate* parity game problem, respectively. In those papers, it was claimed that these approximation problems are in

$\text{NP} \cap \text{coNP}$. Actually there was a minor problem with the way the results on approximation were phrased in [8, 7], as pointed out in the conference version of this paper [18], but this is a relatively unimportant point compared to the flaw we shall now discuss. There is in fact a serious flaw in a key proof of [8]. The flaw relates to the use of a result from [19] which shows that for discounted stochastic games the value function is Lipschitz continuous with respect to the coefficients that define the game as well as the discount β . Importantly, the Lipschitz constant in this result from [19] depends on the discount β (it is inversely proportional to $1 - \beta$). This fact was unfortunately overlooked in [8] and, at a crucial point in their proofs, the Lipschitz constant was assumed to be a fixed constant that does not depend on β . This flaw unfortunately affects several results in [8]. It also affects the results of [7], since the later paper uses the reachability results of [8]. As a consequence of this error, the best upper bound which currently follows from the results in [8, 12, 7] is a PSPACE upper bound for the decision and approximation problems for the value of finite-state concurrent stochastic reachability games as well as for finite-state concurrent stochastic parity games. (See the erratum note for [8] on K. Chatterjee’s web page [9], as well as his Ph.D. thesis.) It is entirely plausible that these results can be repaired and that approximating the value of finite-state concurrent reachability games to within a given additive error $\epsilon > 0$ can in the future be shown to be in $\text{NP} \cap \text{coNP}$, but the flaw in the proof given in [8] is fundamental and does not appear to be easy to fix.

On the other hand, for the quantitative decision problem for finite CSGs (as opposed to the approximation problem), and even the qualitative decision problem for 1-RCSGs, the situation is different. We show here that the quantitative decision problem for finite CSGs, as well as the qualitative decision problem for 1-RCSGs, are both as hard as the square-root sum problem, for which containment even in NP is a long standing open problem. Thus our PSPACE upper bounds here, even for the qualitative termination problem for 1-RCSGs, can not be improved to NP without a major breakthrough. Unlike for 1-RCSGs, the qualitative termination problem for finite CSGs is known to be decidable in P-time ([11]). We note that in recent work Allender et. al. [1] have shown that the square-root sum problem is in (the 4th level of) the “Counting Hierarchy” CH, which is inside PSPACE, but it remains a major open problem to bring this complexity down to NP.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the RCSG model, define the problems that we will study, and give some basic properties. In Section 3 we give a system of equations that characterizes the desired probabilities, and use them to show that the problems are in PSPACE. In Section 4 we prove the existence of optimal randomized stackless and memoryless strategies, and we present a strategy improvement method. Finally in Section 5 we present reductions from the square root sum problem to the quantitative termination problem for finite CSGs, and from the latter to the qualitative problem for Recursive CSGs.

2. BASICS

We have two players, Player 1 and Player 2. Let Γ_1 and Γ_2 be finite sets constituting the *move alphabet* of players 1 and 2, respectively. Formally, a *Recursive Concurrent Stochastic Game (RCSG)* is a tuple $A = (A_1, \dots, A_k)$, where each *component* $A_i = (N_i, B_i, Y_i, \text{En}_i, \text{Ex}_i, \text{pl}_i, \delta_i)$ consists of:

- (1) A finite set N_i of *nodes*, with a distinguished subset En_i of *entry* nodes and a (disjoint) subset Ex_i of *exit* nodes.




Figure 1: Example (1-exit) RCSG

- (2) A finite set B_i of *boxes*, and a mapping $Y_i : B_i \mapsto \{1, \dots, k\}$ that assigns to every box (the index of) a component. To each box $b \in B_i$, we associate a set of *call ports*, $Call_b = \{(b, en) \mid en \in En_{Y(b)}\}$, and a set of *return ports*, $Return_b = \{(b, ex) \mid ex \in Ex_{Y(b)}\}$. Let $Call^i = \cup_{b \in B_i} Call_b$, $Return^i = \cup_{b \in B_i} Return_b$, and let $Q_i = N_i \cup Call^i \cup Return^i$ be the set of all nodes, call ports and return ports; we refer to these as the *vertices* of component A_i .
- (3) A mapping $pl_i : Q_i \mapsto \{0, play\}$ that assigns to every vertex u a type describing how the next transition is chosen: if $pl_i(u) = 0$ it is chosen probabilistically and if $pl_i(u) = play$ it is determined by moves of the two players. Vertices $u \in (Ex_i \cup Call^i)$ have no outgoing transitions; for them we let $pl_i(u) = 0$.
- (4) A transition relation $\delta_i \subseteq (Q_i \times (\mathbb{R} \cup (\Gamma_1 \times \Gamma_2))) \times Q_i$, where for each tuple $(u, x, v) \in \delta_i$, the source $u \in (N_i \setminus Ex_i) \cup Return^i$, the destination $v \in (N_i \setminus En_i) \cup Call^i$, where if $pl(u) = 0$ then x is a real number $p_{u,v} \in [0, 1]$ (the transition probability), and if $pl(u) = play$ then $x = (\gamma_1, \gamma_2) \in \Gamma_1 \times \Gamma_2$. We assume that each vertex $u \in Q_i$ has associated with it a set $\Gamma_1^u \subseteq \Gamma_1$ and a set $\Gamma_2^u \subseteq \Gamma_2$, which constitute player 1 and 2's *legal moves* at vertex u . Thus, if $(u, x, v) \in \delta_i$ and $x = (\gamma_1, \gamma_2)$ then $(\gamma_1, \gamma_2) \in \Gamma_1^u \times \Gamma_2^u$. Additionally, for each vertex u and each $x \in \Gamma_1^u \times \Gamma_2^u$, we assume there is exactly one transition of the form (u, x, v) in δ_i . Furthermore they must satisfy the consistency property: for every $u \in pl^{-1}(0)$, $\sum_{\{v' \mid (u, p_{u,v'}, v') \in \delta_i\}} p_{u,v'} = 1$, unless u is a call port or exit node, neither of which have outgoing transitions, in which case by default $\sum_{v'} p_{u,v'} = 0$.

We use the symbols $(N, B, Q, \delta, \text{etc.})$ without a subscript, to denote the union over all components. Thus, eg. $N = \cup_{i=1}^k N_i$ is the set of all nodes of A , $\delta = \cup_{i=1}^k \delta_i$ the set of all transitions, $Q = \cup_{i=1}^k Q_i$ the set of all vertices, etc. The set Q of vertices is partitioned into the sets $Q_{play} = pl^{-1}(play)$ and $Q_{prob} = pl^{-1}(0)$ of play and probabilistic vertices respectively.

For computational purposes we assume that the transition probabilities $p_{u,v}$ are rational, given in the input as the ratio of two integers written in binary. The *size* of a RCSG is the

space (in number of bits) needed to specify it fully, i.e., the nodes, boxes, and transitions of all components, including the probabilities of all the transitions.

Example 1. An example picture of a (1-exit) RCSG is depicted in Figure 1. This RCSG has one component, f , which has nodes $\{s, t, u_1, u_2, u_3, u_4, u_5\}$. It has one entry node, s , and one exit node, t . It also has two boxes, $\{b_1, b_2\}$, both of which map to the only component, f . All nodes in this RCSG are probabilistic (black nodes) except for nodes u_1 and u_4 which are player nodes (white nodes). The move alphabet for both players is $\{L, R\}$ (for, say, “left” and “right”). At node u_1 both players have both moves enabled. At node u_4 , player 1 has only L enabled, and player 2 has both L and R enabled. \square

An RCSG A defines a global denumerable stochastic game $M_A = (V, \Delta, \mathbf{pl})$ as follows. The global *states* $V \subseteq B^* \times Q$ of M_A are pairs of the form $\langle \beta, u \rangle$, where $\beta \in B^*$ is a (possibly empty) sequence of boxes and $u \in Q$ is a *vertex* of A . More precisely, the states $V \subseteq B^* \times Q$ and transitions Δ are defined inductively as follows:

- (1) $\langle \epsilon, u \rangle \in V$, for $u \in Q$ (ϵ denotes the empty string.)
- (2) If $\langle \beta, u \rangle \in V$ and $(u, x, v) \in \delta$, then $\langle \beta, v \rangle \in V$ and $(\langle \beta, u \rangle, x, \langle \beta, v \rangle) \in \Delta$.
- (3) If $\langle \beta, (b, en) \rangle \in V$, with $(b, en) \in \text{Call}_b$, then $\langle \beta b, en \rangle \in V$ and $(\langle \beta, (b, en) \rangle, 1, \langle \beta b, en \rangle) \in \Delta$.
- (4) If $\langle \beta b, ex \rangle \in V$, and $(b, ex) \in \text{Return}_b$, then $\langle \beta, (b, ex) \rangle \in V$ and $(\langle \beta b, ex \rangle, 1, \langle \beta, (b, ex) \rangle) \in \Delta$.

Item 1 corresponds to the possible initial states, item 2 corresponds to control staying within a component, item 3 is when a new component is entered via a box, item 4 is when control exits a box and returns to the calling component. The mapping $\mathbf{pl} : V \mapsto \{0, \text{play}\}$ is given by $\mathbf{pl}(\langle \beta, u \rangle) = \mathbf{pl}(u)$. The set of vertices V is partitioned into V_{prob} , V_{play} , where $V_{\text{prob}} = \mathbf{pl}^{-1}(0)$ and $V_{\text{play}} = \mathbf{pl}^{-1}(\text{play})$.

We consider M_A with various *initial states* of the form $\langle \epsilon, u \rangle$, denoting this by M_A^u . Some states of M_A are *terminating states* and have no outgoing transitions. These are states $\langle \epsilon, ex \rangle$, where ex is an exit node. If we wish to view M_A as a non-terminating CSG, we can consider the terminating states as absorbing states of M_A , with a self-loop of probability 1.

An RCSG where $|\Gamma_2| = 1$ (i.e., where player 2 has only one action) is called a maximizing *Recursive Markov Decision Process* (RMDP); likewise, when $|\Gamma_1| = 1$ the RCSG is a minimizing RMDP. An RSSG where $|\Gamma_1| = |\Gamma_2| = 1$ is essentially a *Recursive Markov Chain* ([14, 15]).

Our goal is to answer termination questions for RCSGs of the form: “Does player 1 have a strategy to force the game to terminate (i.e., reach node $\langle \epsilon, ex \rangle$), starting at $\langle \epsilon, u \rangle$, with probability $\geq p$, regardless of how player 2 plays?”.

First, some definitions: a *strategy* σ for player i , $i \in \{1, 2\}$, is a function $\sigma : V^* V_{\text{play}} \mapsto \mathcal{D}(\Gamma_i)$, where $\mathcal{D}(\Gamma_i)$ denotes the set of probability distributions on the finite set of moves Γ_i . In other words, given a history $ws \in V^* V_{\text{play}}$, and a strategy σ for, say, player 1, $\sigma(ws)(\gamma)$ defines the probability with which player 1 will play move γ . Moreover, we require that the function σ has the property that for any global state $s = \langle \beta, u \rangle$, with $\mathbf{pl}(u) = \text{play}$, $\sigma(ws) \in \mathcal{D}(\Gamma_i^u)$. In other words, the distribution has support only over eligible moves at vertex u .

Let Ψ_i denote the set of all strategies for player i . Given a history $ws \in V^* V_{\text{play}}$ of play so far, and given a strategy $\sigma \in \Psi_1$ for player 1, and a strategy $\tau \in \Psi_2$ for player 2, the

strategies determine a distribution on the next move of play to a new global state, namely, the transition $(s, (\gamma_1, \gamma_2), s') \in \Delta$ has probability $\sigma(ws)(\gamma_1) * \tau(ws)(\gamma_2)$. This way, given a start node u , a strategy $\sigma \in \Psi_1$, and a strategy $\tau \in \Psi_2$, we define a new Markov chain (with initial state u) $M_A^{u, \sigma, \tau} = (\mathcal{S}, \Delta')$. The states $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \langle \epsilon, u \rangle V^*$ of $M_A^{u, \sigma, \tau}$ are non-empty sequences of states of M_A , which must begin with $\langle \epsilon, u \rangle$. Inductively, if $ws \in \mathcal{S}$, then: (0) if $s \in V_{\text{prob}}$ and $(s, p_{s, s'}, s') \in \Delta$ then $wss' \in \mathcal{S}$ and $(ws, p_{s, s'}, wss') \in \Delta'$; (1) if $s \in V_{\text{play}}$, where $(s, (\gamma_1, \gamma_2), s') \in \Delta$, then if $\sigma(ws)(\gamma_1) > 0$ and $\tau(ws)(\gamma_2) > 0$ then $wss' \in \mathcal{S}$ and $(ws, p, wss') \in \Delta'$, where $p = \sigma(ws)(\gamma_1) * \tau(ws)(\gamma_2)$.

Given initial vertex u , and final exit ex in the same component, and given strategies $\sigma \in \Psi_1$ and $\tau \in \Psi_2$, for $k \geq 0$, let $q_{(u, ex)}^{k, \sigma, \tau}$ be the probability that, in $M_A^{u, \sigma, \tau}$, starting at initial state $\langle \epsilon, u \rangle$, we will reach a state $w \langle \epsilon, ex \rangle$ in at most k “steps” (i.e., where $|w| \leq k$). Let $q_{(u, ex)}^{*, \sigma, \tau} = \lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} q_{(u, ex)}^{k, \sigma, \tau}$ be the probability of ever terminating at ex , i.e., reaching $\langle \epsilon, ex \rangle$. (Note, the limit exists: it is a monotonically non-decreasing sequence bounded by 1). Let $q_{(u, ex)}^k = \sup_{\sigma \in \Psi_1} \inf_{\tau \in \Psi_2} q_{(u, ex)}^{k, \sigma, \tau}$ and let $q_{(u, ex)}^* = \sup_{\sigma \in \Psi_1} \inf_{\tau \in \Psi_2} q_{(u, ex)}^{*, \sigma, \tau}$. For a strategy $\sigma \in \Psi_1$, let $q_{(u, ex)}^{k, \sigma} = \inf_{\tau \in \Psi_2} q_{(u, ex)}^{k, \sigma, \tau}$, and let $q_{(u, ex)}^{*, \sigma} = \inf_{\tau \in \Psi_2} q_{(u, ex)}^{*, \sigma, \tau}$. Lastly, given a strategy $\tau \in \Psi_2$, let $q_{(u, ex)}^{k, \cdot, \tau} = \sup_{\sigma \in \Psi_1} q_{(u, ex)}^{k, \sigma, \tau}$, and let $q_{(u, ex)}^{*, \cdot, \tau} = \sup_{\sigma \in \Psi_1} q_{(u, ex)}^{*, \sigma, \tau}$.

From, general determinacy results (e.g., “Blackwell determinacy” [26] which applies to all Borel two-player zero-sum stochastic games with countable state spaces; see also [25]) it follows that the games M_A are *determined*, meaning:

$$\sup_{\sigma \in \Psi_1} \inf_{\tau \in \Psi_2} q_{(u, ex)}^{*, \sigma, \tau} = \inf_{\tau \in \Psi_2} \sup_{\sigma \in \Psi_1} q_{(u, ex)}^{*, \sigma, \tau}.$$

We call a strategy σ for either player a (randomized) *Stackless and Memoryless (r-SM)* strategy if it neither depends on the history of the game, nor on the current call stack. In other words, a r-SM strategy σ for player i is given by a function $\sigma : Q_{\text{play}} \mapsto \mathcal{D}(\Gamma_i)$, which maps each play vertex u of the RCSG to a probability distribution $\sigma(u) \in \mathcal{D}(\Gamma_i^u)$ on the moves available to player i at vertex u .

We are interested in the following computational problems.

- (1) The *qualitative* termination problem: Is $q_{(u, ex)}^* = 1$?
- (2) The *quantitative* termination (decision) problem:
given $r \in [0, 1]$, is $q_{(u, ex)}^* \geq r$? Is $q_{(u, ex)}^* \leq r$?

The *approximate* version: approximate $q_{(u, ex)}^*$ to within desired precision.

Obviously, the qualitative termination problem is a special case of the quantitative problem, setting $r = 1$. As mentioned, for multi-exit RCSGs these are all undecidable. Thus we focus on *single-exit* RCSGs (*1-RCSGs*), where every component has one exit. Since for 1-RCSGs it is always clear which exit we wish to terminate at starting at vertex u (there is only one exit in u ’s component), we abbreviate $q_{(u, ex)}^*, q_{(u, ex)}^{*, \sigma}$, etc., as $q_u^*, q_u^{*, \sigma}$, etc., and we likewise abbreviate other subscripts.

A different “qualitative” problem is to ask whether $q_u^* = 0$? As we will show in Proposition 3.4, this is an easy problem: deciding whether $q_u^* = 0$ for a vertex u in a 1-RCSG can be done in polynomial time, and only depends on the transition structure of the 1-RCSG, not on the specific probabilities.

As mentioned in the introduction, it is known that for concurrent stochastic games, probabilistic nodes do not add any power, and can in effect be “simulated” by concurrent nodes alone (this fact was communicated to us by K. Chatterjee [6]). The same fact is true for 1-RCSGs. Specifically, the following holds:

Proposition 2.1. *There is a P-time reduction F , which, given a finite CSG (or a 1-RCSG), G , computes a finite concurrent game (or 1-RCG, respectively) $F(G)$, without any probabilistic vertices, such that the value of the game G is exactly the same as the value of the game $F(G)$.*

Proof. First, suppose for now that in G all probabilistic transitions have probability $1/2$. In other words, suppose that for a probabilistic vertex $s \in \text{pl}^{-1}(0)$ (which is not an exit or a call port) in an 1-RCSG, we have two transitions $(s, 1/2, t) \in \delta$ and $(s, 1/2, t') \in \delta$. In the new game $F(G)$, change s to a play vertex, i.e., let $\text{pl}(s) = \text{play}$, and let $\Gamma_1^s = \Gamma_2^s = \{a, b\}$, and replace the probabilistic transitions out of s with the following 4 transitions: $(s, (a, b), t)$, $(s, (b, a), t)$, $(s, (a, a), t')$ and $(s, (b, b), t')$. Do this for all probabilistic vertices in G , thus obtaining $F(G)$ which contains no probabilistic vertices.

Now, consider any strategy σ for player 1 in the original game G , and a strategy σ' in the new game $F(G)$ that is consistent with σ , i.e. for each history ending at an original play vertex σ' has the same distribution as σ (and for the other histories ending at probabilistic vertices it has an arbitrary distribution). For any strategy τ for player 2 in the game G , consider the strategy, $F(\tau)$, for player 2 in $F(G)$, which is defined as follows: whenever the play reaches a probabilistic vertex s of G (in any context and with any history) $F(\tau)$ plays a and b with $1/2$ probability each. At all non-probabilistic vertices of G , $F(\tau)$ plays exactly as τ (and it may use the history, etc.). This way, no matter what player 1 does, whenever play reaches the vertex s (in any context) the play will move from s to t and to t' with probability $1/2$ each. Thus for any vertex u , the value $q_u^{*,\sigma,\tau}$ in the game G is the same as the value $q_u^{*,\sigma',F(\tau)}$ in the game $F(G)$. So the optimal payoff value for player 1 in the game starting at any vertex u is not greater in $F(G)$ than in G . A completely symmetric argument shows that for player 2 the optimal payoff value starting at u is not greater in $F(G)$ than in G . Thus, the value of the game starting at u is the same in both games.

We can now generalize this to arbitrary rational probabilities on transitions, instead of just probability $1/2$, by using a basic trick to encode arbitrary finite probability distributions using a polynomial-sized finite Markov chain all of whose transitions have probability $1/2$. Namely, suppose u goes to v_1 with probability p/q and to v_2 with probability $1 - p/q$, where p, q are integers with k bits (we can write both as k -bit numbers, by adding leading 0's to p if necessary so that it has length exactly k , same as q). Flip (at most) k coins. View this as generating a k bit binary number. If the number that comes out is $< p$ (i.e. $0, \dots, p-1$), then go to v_1 , if between p and q (i.e., $p, \dots, q-1$) then go to v_2 , if $\geq q$ go back to the start, u . A naive way to do this would require exponentially many states in k . But we only need at most $2k$ states to encode this if we don't necessarily flip all k coins but rather do the transition to v_1, v_2 or u , as soon as the outcome is clear from the coin flips. That is, if the sequence α formed by the initial sequence of coin flips so far differs from both the prefixes p', q' of p and q of the same length, then we do the transition: if $\alpha < p'$ transition to v_1 , if $p' < \alpha < q'$ transition to v_2 , and if $\alpha > q'$ then transition to u . Thus, we only need to remember the number j of coins flipped so far, and if j is greater than the length of the common prefix of p and q then we need to remember also whether the coin flips so far agree with p or with q .

Clearly, a simple generalization of this argument works for generating arbitrary finite rational probability distributions $p_1/q, p_2/q, \dots, p_r/q$, such that $\sum_{i=1}^r (p_i/q) = 1$. If q is a k -bit integer, then the number of new states needed is at most rk , i.e. linear in the encoding length of the rationals $p_1/q, \dots, p_r/q$. \square

3. NONLINEAR MINIMAX EQUATIONS FOR 1-RCSGS

In ([16]) we defined a monotone system S_A of nonlinear min-& -max equations for 1-RSSGs (i.e. the case of simple games), and showed that its *least fixed point* solution yields the desired probabilities q_u^* . Here we generalize these to nonlinear minimax systems for concurrent games, 1-RCSGs. Let us use a variable x_u for each unknown q_u^* , and let x be the vector of all x_u , $u \in Q$. The system S_A has one equation of the form $x_u = P_u(\mathbf{x})$ for each vertex u . Suppose that u is in component A_i with (unique) exit ex . There are 4 cases based on the “Type” of u .

- (1) $u \in Type_1$: $u = ex$. In this case: $x_u = 1$.
- (2) $u \in Type_{rand}$: $pl(u) = 0$ and $u \in (N_i \setminus \{ex\}) \cup Return^i$. Then the equation is $x_u = \sum_{\{v | (u, p_{u,v}, v) \in \delta\}} p_{u,v} x_v$. (If u has no outgoing transitions, this equation is by definition $x_u = 0$.)
- (3) $u \in Type_{call}$: $u = (b, en)$ is a call port. The equation is $x_{(b,en)} = x_{en} \cdot x_{(b,ex')}$, where $ex' \in Ex_{Y(b)}$ is the unique exit of $A_{Y(b)}$.
- (4) $u \in Type_{play}$. Then the equation is $x_u = \text{Val}(A_u(x))$, where the right-hand side is defined as follows. Given a value vector x , and a play vertex u , consider the zero-sum matrix game given by matrix $A_u(x)$, whose rows are indexed by player 1's moves Γ_1^u from node u , and whose columns are indexed by player 2's moves Γ_2^u . The payoff to player 1 under the pair of deterministic moves $\gamma_1 \in \Gamma_1^u$, and $\gamma_2 \in \Gamma_2^u$, is given by $(A_u(x))_{\gamma_1, \gamma_2} := x_v$, where $(u, (\gamma_1, \gamma_2), v) \in \delta$. Let $\text{Val}(A_u(x))$ be the value of this zero-sum matrix game. By von Neumann's minimax theorem, the value and optimal mixed strategies exist, and they can be obtained by solving a Linear Program with coefficients given by the x_i 's.

In vector notation, we denote the system S_A by $x = P(x)$. Given 1-exit RCSG A , we can easily construct this system. Note that the operator $P : \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^n \mapsto \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^n$ is *monotone*: for $x, y \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^n$, if $x \leq y$ then $P(x) \leq P(y)$. This follows because for two game matrices A and B of the same dimensions, if $A \leq B$ (i.e., $A_{i,j} \leq B_{i,j}$ for all i and j), then $\text{Val}(A) \leq \text{Val}(B)$. Note that by definition of $A_u(x)$, for $x \leq y$, $A_u(x) \leq A_u(y)$.

Example 2. We now construct the system of nonlinear minimax functional equations, $x = P(x)$, associated with the 1-RCSG we encountered in Figure 1 (see Example 1). We shall need one variable for every *vertex* of that 1-RCSG, to represent the value of the termination game starting at that vertex, and we will need one equation for each such variable. Thus, the variables we need are $x_s, x_t, x_{u_1}, \dots, x_{u_5}, x_{(b_1,s)}, x_{(b_1,t)}, x_{(b_2,s)}, x_{(b_2,t)}$. The equations are as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
x_t &= 1 \\
x_s &= (1/2)x_{(b_1,s)} + (1/4)x_t + (1/4)x_{u_1} \\
x_{u_5} &= x_{u_5} \\
x_{u_2} &= x_{(b_2,s)} \\
x_{u_3} &= (1/2)x_{u_2} + (1/2)x_t \\
x_{(b_1,s)} &= x_s x_{(b_1,t)} \\
x_{(b_1,t)} &= x_{(b_2,s)} \\
x_{(b_2,s)} &= x_s x_{(b_2,t)} \\
x_{(b_2,t)} &= x_t \\
x_{u_1} &= \text{Val} \left(\begin{bmatrix} x_{u_2} & x_{u_3} \\ x_{u_4} & x_{u_5} \end{bmatrix} \right) \\
x_{u_4} &= \text{Val} \left(\begin{bmatrix} x_{(b_2,s)} & x_t \end{bmatrix} \right)
\end{aligned}$$

□

We now identify a particular solution to $x = P(x)$, called the *Least Fixed Point* (LFP) solution, which gives precisely the termination game values. Define $P^1(x) = P(x)$, and define $P^k(x) = P(P^{k-1}(x))$, for $k > 1$. Let $q^* \in \mathbb{R}^n$ denote the n -vector $q_u^*, u \in Q$ (using the same indexing as used for x). For $k \geq 0$, let q^k denote, similarly, the n -vector $q_u^k, u \in Q$.

Theorem 3.1. *Let $x = P(x)$ be the system S_A associated with 1-RCSG A . Then $q^* = P(q^*)$, and for all $q' \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^n$, if $q' = P(q')$, then $q^* \leq q'$ (i.e., q^* is the Least Fixed Point, of $P : \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^n \mapsto \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^n$). Moreover, $\lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} P^k(\mathbf{0}) \uparrow q^*$, i.e., the “value iteration” sequence $P^k(\mathbf{0})$ converges monotonically to the LFP, q^* .*

Proof. We first prove that $q^* = P(q^*)$. Suppose $q^* \neq P(q^*)$. The equations for vertices u of types *Type₁*, *Type_{rand}*, and *Type_{call}* can be used to define precisely the values q_u^* in terms of other values q_v^* . Thus, the only possibility is that $q_u^* \neq P_u(q^*)$ for some vertex u of *Type_{play}*. In other words, $q_u^* \neq \text{Val}(A_u(q^*))$.

Suppose $q_u^* < \text{Val}(A_u(q^*))$. To see that this can’t happen, we construct a strategy σ for player 1 that achieves better. At node u , let player 1’s strategy σ play in one step its optimal randomized minimax strategy in the game $A_u(q^*)$ (which exists according to the minimax theorem). Choose $\epsilon > 0$ such that $\epsilon < \text{Val}(A_u(q^*)) - q_u^*$. After the first step, at any vertex v player 1’s strategy σ will play in such a way that achieves a value $\geq q_v^* - \epsilon$ (i.e., an ϵ -optimal strategy in the rest of the game, which must exist because the game is determined). Let ϵ be an n -vector every entry of which is ϵ . Now, the matrix game $A_u(q^* - \epsilon)$ is just an additive translation of the matrix game $A_u(q^*)$, and thus it has precisely the same ϵ -optimal strategies as the matrix game $A_u(q^*)$, and moreover $\text{Val}(A_u(q^* - \epsilon)) = \text{Val}(A_u(q^*)) - \epsilon$. Thus, by playing strategy σ , player 1 guarantees a value which is $\geq \text{Val}(A_u(q^* - \epsilon)) = \text{Val}(A_u(q^*)) - \epsilon > q_u^*$, which is a contradiction. Thus $q_u^* \geq \text{Val}(A_u(q^*))$.

A completely analogous argument works for player 2, and shows that $q_u^* \leq \text{Val}(A_u(q^*))$. Thus $q_u^* = \text{Val}(A_u(q^*))$, and hence $q^* = P(q^*)$.

Next, we prove that if q' is any vector such that $q' = P(q')$, then $q^* \leq q'$. Let τ' be the randomized stackless and memoryless strategy for player 2 that always picks, at any

state $\langle \beta, u \rangle$, for play vertex $u \in Q_{\text{play}}$, a mixed 1-step strategy which is an optimal strategy in the matrix game $A_u(q')$. (Again, the existence of such a strategy is guaranteed by the minimax theorem.)

Lemma 3.2. *For all strategies $\sigma \in \Psi_1$ of player 1, and for all $k \geq 0$, $q^{k,\sigma,\tau'} \leq q'$.*

Proof. By induction. The base case $q^{0,\sigma,\tau'} \leq q'$ is trivial.

- (1) *Type₁*. If $u = ex$ is an exit, then for all $k \geq 0$, clearly $q_{ex}^{k,\sigma,\tau'} = q'_{ex} = 1$.
- (2) *Type_{rand}*. Let σ' be the strategy defined by $\sigma'(\beta) = \sigma(\langle \epsilon, u \rangle \beta)$ for all $\beta \in V^*$. Then,

$$q_u^{k+1,\sigma,\tau'} = \sum_v p_{u,v} q_v^{k,\sigma',\tau'} \leq \sum_v p_{u,v} q'_v = q'_u.$$

- (3) *Type_{call}*. In this case, $u = (b, en) \in \text{Call}_b$, and $q_u^{k+1,\sigma,\tau'} \leq \sup_\rho q_{en}^{k,\rho,\tau'} \cdot \sup_\rho q_{(b,ex')}^{k,\rho,\tau'}$, where $ex' \in \text{Ex}_{Y(b)}$ is the unique exit node of $A_{Y(b)}$. Now, by the inductive assumption, $q^{k,\rho,\tau'} \leq q'$ for all ρ . Moreover, since $q' = P(q')$, $q'_u = q'_{en} \cdot q'_{(b,ex')}$. Hence, using these inequalities and substituting, we get

$$q_u^{k+1,\sigma,\tau'} \leq q'_{en} q'_{(b,ex')} = q'_u.$$

- (4) *Type_{play}*: In this case, starting at $\langle \epsilon, u \rangle$, whatever player 1's strategy σ is, it has the property that $q_u^{k+1,\sigma,\tau'} \leq \text{Val}(A_u(q^{k,\sigma',\tau'}))$. By the inductive hypothesis $q_v^{k,\sigma',\tau'} \leq q'_v$, so we are done by induction and by the monotonicity of $\text{Val}(A_u(x))$. □

Now, by the lemma, $q^{*,\sigma,\tau'} = \lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} q^{k,\sigma,\tau'} \leq q'$. This holds for any strategy $\sigma \in \Psi_1$. Therefore, $\sup_{\sigma \in \Psi_1} q_u^{*,\sigma,\tau'} \leq q'_u$, for every vertex u . Thus, by the determinacy of RCSG games, we have established that $q_u^* = \inf_{\tau \in \Psi_2} \sup_{\sigma \in \Psi_1} q_u^{*,\sigma,\tau} \leq q'_u$, for all vertices u . In other words, $q^* \leq q'$. The fact that $\lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} P^k(\mathbf{0}) \uparrow \mathbf{q}^*$ follows from a simple Tarski-Knaster argument. □

Example 3. For the system of equations $x = P(x)$ given in Example 2, associated with the 1-RCSG given in Example 1, fairly easy calculations using the equations show that the Least Fixed Point of the system (and thus the game values, starting at the different vertices) is as follows: $q_t^* = q_{(b_2,t)}^* = 1$; $q_{u_5}^* = 0$; $q_s^* = q_{u_1}^* = q_{u_2}^* = q_{u_4}^* = q_{(b_1,t)}^* = q_{(b_2,s)}^* = 0.5$; $q_{u_3}^* = 0.75$; and $q_{(b_1,s)}^* = 0.25$.

In this case the values turn out to be rational and are simple to compute, but in general the values may be irrational and difficult to compute, and even if they are rational they may require exponentially many bits to represent (in standard notation, e.g., via reduced numerator and denominator given in binary) in terms of the size of the input 1-RCSG or equation system.

Furthermore, in this game there are pure optimal (stackless and memoryless) strategies for both players. Specifically, the strategy for player 1 (maximizer) that always plays L from nodes u_1 is optimal, and the strategy for player 2 that always plays L from nodes u_1 and u_4 is optimal. In general for 1-RCSGs, we show randomized stackless and memoryless ϵ -optimal and optimal strategies do exist for players 1 and 2, respectively. However, for player 1 only ϵ -optimal strategies may exist, and although optimal strategies do exist for player 2 they may require randomization using irrational probabilities. This is the case even for finite-state concurrent games. □

We can use the system of equations to establish the following upper bound for computing the value of a 1-RCSG termination game:

Theorem 3.3. *The qualitative and quantitative termination problems for 1-exit RCSGs can be solved in PSPACE. That is, given a 1-exit RCSG A , vertex u and a rational probability p , there is a PSPACE algorithm to decide whether $\mathbf{q}_u^* \leq p$ (or $\mathbf{q}^* \geq p$, or $\mathbf{q}^* < p$, etc.). The running time is $O(|A|^{O(n)})$ where n is the number of variables in $\mathbf{x} = P(\mathbf{x})$. We can also approximate the vector \mathbf{q}^* of values to within a specified number of bits i of precision (i given in unary), in PSPACE and in time $O(i|A|^{O(n)})$.*

Proof. Using the system $x = P(x)$, we can express the condition $q_u^* \leq c$ by a sentence in the existential theory of the reals as follows:

$$\exists x_1, \dots, x_n \bigwedge_{i=1}^n (x_i = P_i(x_1, \dots, x_n)) \wedge \bigwedge_{i=1}^n (x_i \geq 0) \wedge (x_u \leq c)$$

Note that the sentence is true, i.e. there exists a vector x that satisfies the constraints of the above sentence if and only if the least fixed point \mathbf{q}^* satisfies them. The constraints $x_i = P_i(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ for vertices i of type 1, 2, and 3 (exit, probabilistic vertex and call port) are clearly polynomial equations, as they should be in a sentence of the existential theory of the reals. We only need to show how to express equations of the form $x_v = \text{Val}(A_v(\mathbf{x}))$ in the existential theory of reals. We can then appeal to well known results for deciding that theory ([5, 27]). But this is a standard fact in game theory (see, e.g., [2, 19, 12] where it is used for finite CSGs). The minimax theorem and its LP encoding allow the predicate “ $y = \text{Val}(A_v(\mathbf{x}))$ ” to be expressed as an existential formula $\varphi(y, x)$ in the theory of reals with free variables y and x_1, \dots, x_n , such that for every $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$, there exists a unique y (the game value) satisfying $\varphi(y, \mathbf{x})$. Specifically, the formula includes, besides the free variables \mathbf{x}, y , existentially quantified variables $z_{\gamma_1}, \gamma_1 \in \Gamma_1^v$, and $w_{\gamma_2}, \gamma_2 \in \Gamma_2^v$ for the probabilities of the moves of the two players, and the conjunction of the following constraints (recall that each entry $A_u(\gamma_1, \gamma_2)$ of the matrix A_u is a variable x_v where v is the vertex such that $(u, (\gamma_1, \gamma_2), v) \in \delta$) :

$$\begin{aligned} & z_{\gamma_1} \geq 0 \text{ for all } \gamma_1 \in \Gamma_1^v; \quad \sum_{\gamma_1 \in \Gamma_1^v} z_{\gamma_1} = 1; \\ & w_{\gamma_2} \geq 0 \text{ for all } \gamma_2 \in \Gamma_2^v; \quad \sum_{\gamma_2 \in \Gamma_2^v} w_{\gamma_2} = 1; \\ & \sum_{\gamma_1 \in \Gamma_1^v} A_u(\gamma_1, \gamma_2) z_{\gamma_1} \geq y \text{ for all } \gamma_2 \in \Gamma_2^v; \\ & \sum_{\gamma_2 \in \Gamma_2^v} A_u(\gamma_1, \gamma_2) w_{\gamma_2} \leq y \text{ for all } \gamma_1 \in \Gamma_1^v. \end{aligned}$$

To approximate the vector of game values within given precision we can do binary search using queries of the form $q_u^* \leq c$ for all vertices u . \square

Determining the vertices u for which the value q_u^* is 0, is easier and can be done in polynomial time, as in the case of the turn-based 1-RSSGs [17].

Proposition 3.4. *Given a 1-RCSG we can compute in polynomial time the set Z of vertices u such that $q_u^* = 0$. This set Z depends only on the structure of the given 1-RCSG and not on the actual values of the transition probabilities.*

Proof. From the system of fixed point equations we have the following: (1) all exit nodes are not in Z ; (2) a probabilistic node u is in Z if and only if all its (immediate) successors v are in Z ; (3) the call port $u = (b, en)$ of a box b is in Z if and only if the entry node en of the corresponding component $Y(b)$ is in Z or the return port (b, ex) is in Z ; (4) a play

node u is in Z if and only if Player 2 has a move $\gamma_2 \in \Gamma_2^u$ such that for all moves $\gamma_1 \in \Gamma_1^u$ of Player 1, the next node v , i.e. the (unique) node v such that $(u, (\gamma_1, \gamma_2), v) \in \delta$, is in Z .

Only the last case of a play node u needs an explanation. If Player 2 has such a move γ_2 , then clearly the corresponding column of the game matrix $A_u(\mathbf{q}^*)$ has all the entries 0, and the value of the game (i.e., q_u^*) is 0. Conversely, if every column of $A_u(\mathbf{q}^*)$ has a nonzero entry, then the value of the game with this matrix is positive because for example Player 1 can give equal probability to all his moves. Thus, in effect, as far as computing the vertices with zero value is concerned, we can fix the strategy of Player 1 at each play vertex to play at all times all legal moves with equal probability to get a 1-RMDP; a vertex has nonzero value in the given 1-RCSG iff it has nonzero value in the 1-RMDP.

The algorithm to compute the set Z of vertices with 0 value is similar to the case of 1-RSSGs [17]. Initialize Z to $Q \setminus Ex$, the set of non-exit vertices. Repeat the following until there is no change:

- If there is a probabilistic node $u \in Z$ that has a successor not in Z , then remove u from Z .
- If there is a call port $u = (b, en) \in Z$ such that both the entry node en of the corresponding component $Y(b)$ and the return port (b, ex) of the box are not in Z , then remove u from Z .
- If there is a play node $u \in Z$ such that for every move $\gamma_2 \in \Gamma_2^u$ of Player 2 there is a move $\gamma_1 \in \Gamma_1^u$ of Player 1 such that the next node v from u under (γ_1, γ_2) is not in Z , then remove u from Z .

There are at most n iterations and at the end Z is the set of vertices u such that $q_u^* = 0$. \square

4. STRATEGY IMPROVEMENT AND RANDOMIZED-SM-DETERMINACY

The proof of Theorem 1 implies the following:

Corollary 4.1. *In every 1-RCSG termination game, player 2 (the minimizer) has an optimal r-SM strategy.*

Proof. Consider the strategy τ' in the proof of Theorem 3.1, chosen not for just any fixed point \mathbf{q}' , but for \mathbf{q}^* itself. That strategy is r-SM and is optimal. \square

Player 1 does not have optimal r-SM strategies, not even in finite concurrent stochastic games (see, e.g., [19, 12]). We next establish that it does have finite r-SM ϵ -optimal strategies, meaning that it has, for every $\epsilon > 0$, a r-SM strategy that guarantees a value of at least $q_u^* - \epsilon$, starting from every vertex u in the termination game. We say that a game is *r-SM-determined* if, letting Ψ'_1 and Ψ'_2 denote the set of r-SM strategies for players 1 and 2, respectively, we have $\sup_{\sigma \in \Psi'_1} \inf_{\tau \in \Psi'_2} q_u^{*,\sigma,\tau} = \inf_{\tau \in \Psi'_2} \sup_{\sigma \in \Psi'_1} q_u^{*,\sigma,\tau}$.

Theorem 4.2.

- (1) (*Strategy Improvement*) *Starting at any r-SM strategy σ_0 for player 1, via local strategy improvement steps at individual vertices, we can derive a series of r-SM strategies $\sigma_0, \sigma_1, \sigma_2, \dots$, such that for all $\epsilon > 0$, there exists $i \geq 0$ such that for all $j \geq i$, σ_j is an ϵ -optimal strategy for player 1 starting at any vertex, i.e., $q_u^{*,\sigma_j} \geq q_u^* - \epsilon$ for all vertices u .*

Each strategy improvement step involves solving the quantitative termination problem for a corresponding 1-RMDP. Thus, for classes where this problem is known to be in P-time (such as linearly-recursive 1-RMDPs, [16]), strategy improvement steps can be carried out in polynomial time.

- (2) *Player 1 has ϵ -optimal r -SM strategies, for all $\epsilon > 0$, in 1-RCSG termination games.*
- (3) *1-RCSG termination games are r -SM-determined.*

Proof. Note that (2.) follows immediately from (1.), and (3.) follows because by Corollary 4.1, player 2 has an optimal r -SM strategy and thus

$$\sup_{\sigma \in \Psi'_1} \inf_{\tau \in \Psi'_2} q_u^{*,\sigma,\tau} = \inf_{\tau \in \Psi'_2} \sup_{\sigma \in \Psi'_1} q_u^{*,\sigma,\tau}.$$

Let σ be any r -SM strategy for player 1. Consider $q^{*,\sigma}$. First, let us note that if $q^{*,\sigma} = P(q^{*,\sigma})$ then $q^{*,\sigma} = q^*$. This is so because, by Theorem 3.1, $q^* \leq q^{*,\sigma}$, and on the other hand, σ is just one strategy for player 1, and for every vertex u , $q_u^* = \sup_{\sigma' \in \Psi_1} \inf_{\tau \in \Psi_2} q_u^{*,\sigma',\tau} \geq \inf_{\tau \in \Psi_2} q_u^{*,\sigma,\tau} = q_u^{*,\sigma}$.

Next we claim that, for all vertices $u \notin \text{Type}_{\text{play}}$, $q_u^{*,\sigma}$ satisfies its equation in $x = P(x)$. In other words, $q_u^{*,\sigma} = P_u(q^{*,\sigma})$. To see this, note that for vertices $u \notin \text{Type}_{\text{play}}$, no choice of either player is involved, thus the equation holds by definition of $q^{*,\sigma}$. Thus, the only equations that may fail are those for $u \in \text{Type}_{\text{play}}$, of the form $x_u = \text{Val}(A_u(x))$. We need the following.

Lemma 4.3. *For any r -SM strategy σ for player 1, and for any $u \in \text{Type}_{\text{play}}$, $q_u^{*,\sigma} \leq \text{Val}(A_u(q^{*,\sigma}))$.*

Proof. We are claiming that $q_u^{*,\sigma} = \inf_{\tau \in \Psi_2} q_u^{*,\sigma,\tau} \leq \text{Val}(A_u(q^{*,\sigma}))$. The inequality follows because a strategy for player 2 can in the first step starting at vertex u play its optimal strategy in the matrix game $A_u(q^{*,\sigma})$, and thereafter, depending on which vertex v is the immediate successor of u in the play, the strategy can play “optimally” to force at most the value $q_v^{*,\sigma}$. \square

Now, suppose that for some $u \in \text{Type}_{\text{play}}$, $q_u^{*,\sigma} \neq \text{Val}(A_u(q^{*,\sigma}))$. Thus by the lemma $q_u^{*,\sigma} < \text{Val}(A_u(q^{*,\sigma}))$. Consider a revised r -SM strategy for player 1, σ' , which is identical to σ , except that locally at vertex u the strategy is changed so that $\sigma'(u) = p^{*,u,\sigma}$, where $p^{*,u,\sigma} \in \mathcal{D}(\Gamma_1^u)$ is an optimal mixed minimax strategy for player 1 in the matrix game $A_u(q^{*,\sigma})$. We will show that switching from σ to σ' will improve player 1’s payoff at vertex u , and will not reduce its payoff at any other vertex.

Consider a parameterized 1-RCSG, $A(t)$, which is identical to A , except that u is a randomizing vertex, all edges out of vertex u are removed, and replaced by a single edge labeled by probability variable t to the exit of the same component, and an edge with remaining probability $1 - t$ to a dead vertex. Fixing the value t determines an 1-RCSG, $A(t)$. Note that if we restrict the r -SM strategies σ or σ' to all vertices other than u , then they both define the same r -SM strategy for the 1-RCSG $A(t)$. For each vertex z and strategy τ of player 2, define $q_z^{*,\sigma,\tau,t}$ to be the probability of eventually terminating starting from $\langle \epsilon, z \rangle$ in the Markov chain $M_{A(t)}^{z,\sigma,\tau}$. Let $f_z(t) = \inf_{\tau \in \Psi_2} q_z^{*,\sigma,\tau,t}$. Recall that $\sigma'(u) = p^{*,u,\sigma} \in \mathcal{D}(\Gamma_1^u)$ defines a probability distribution on the actions available to player 1 at vertex u . Thus $p^{*,u,\sigma}(\gamma_1)$ is the probability of action $\gamma_1 \in \Gamma_1$. Let $\gamma_2 \in \Gamma_2$ be any action of player 2 for the 1-step zero-sum game with game matrix $A_u(q^{*,\sigma})$. Let $w(\gamma_1, \gamma_2)$ denote the vertex such that $(u, (\gamma_1, \gamma_2), w(\gamma_1, \gamma_2)) \in \delta$. Let $h_{\gamma_2}(t) = \sum_{\gamma_1 \in \Gamma_1} p^{*,u,\sigma}(\gamma_1) f_{w(\gamma_1, \gamma_2)}(t)$.

Lemma 4.4. *Fix the vertex u . Let $\varphi : \mathbb{R} \mapsto \mathbb{R}$ be any function $\varphi \in \{f_z \mid z \in Q\} \cup \{h_\gamma \mid \gamma \in \Gamma_2^u\}$. The following properties hold:*

- (1) *If $\varphi(t) > t$ at some point $t \in [0, 1]$, then $\varphi(t') > t'$ for all $0 \leq t' < t$.*
- (2) *If $\varphi(t) < t$ at some point $t \in [0, 1]$, then $\varphi(t') < t'$ for all $1 > t' > t$.*

Proof. First, we prove this for $\varphi = f_z$, for some vertex z .

Note that, once player 1 picks a r-SM strategy, a 1-RCSG becomes a 1-RMDP. By a result of [16], player 2 has an optimal deterministic SM response strategy. Furthermore, there is such a strategy that is optimal regardless of the starting vertex. Thus, for any value of t , player 2 has an optimal deterministic SM strategy τ_t , such that for any start vertex z , we have $\tau_t = \arg \min_{\tau \in \Psi_2} q_z^{*,\sigma,\tau,t}$. Let $g_{z,\tau}(t) = q_z^{*,\sigma,\tau,t}$, and let $d\Psi_2$ be the (finite) set of deterministic SM strategies of player 2. Then $f_z(t) = \min_{\tau \in d\Psi_2} g_{z,\tau}(t)$. Now, note that the function $g_{z,\tau}(t)$ is the probability of reaching an exit in an RMC starting from a particular vertex. Thus, by [14], $g_{z,\tau}(t) = (\lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} R^k(\mathbf{0}))_z$ for a polynomial system $\mathbf{x} = R(\mathbf{x})$ with non-negative coefficients, but with the additional feature that the variable t appears as one of the coefficients. Since this limit can be described by a power series in the variable t with non-negative coefficients, $g_{z,\tau}(t)$ has the following properties: it is a continuous, differentiable, and non-decreasing function of $t \in [0, 1]$, with continuous and non-decreasing derivative, $g'_{z,\tau}(t)$, and since the limit defines probabilities we also know that for $t \in [0, 1]$, $g_{z,\tau}(t) \in [0, 1]$. Thus $g_{z,\tau}(0) \geq 0$ and $g_{z,\tau}(1) \leq 1$.

Hence, since $g'_{z,\tau}(t)$ is non-decreasing, if for some $t \in [0, 1]$, $g_{z,\tau}(t) > t$, then for all $t' < t$, $g_{z,\tau}(t') > t'$. To see this, note that if $g_{z,\tau}(t) > t$ and $g'_{z,\tau}(t) \geq 1$, then for all $t'' > t$, $g_{z,\tau}(t'') > t''$, which contradicts the fact that $g_{z,\tau}(1) = 1$. Thus $g'_{z,\tau}(t) < 1$, and since $g'_{z,\tau}$ is non-decreasing, it follows that $g'_{z,\tau}(t') < 1$ for all $t' \leq t$. Since $g_{z,\tau}(t) > t$, we also have $g_{z,\tau}(t') > t'$ for all $t' < t$.

Similarly, if $g_{z,\tau}(t) < t$ for some t , then $g_{z,\tau}(t'') < t''$ for all $t'' \in [t, 1]$. To see this, note that if for some $t'' > t$, $t'' < 1$, $g_{z,\tau}(t'') = t''$, then since $g'_{z,\tau}$ is non-decreasing and $g_{z,\tau}(t) < t$, it must be the case that $g'_{z,\tau}(t'') > 1$. But then $g_{z,\tau}(1) > 1$, which is a contradiction.

It follows that $f_z(t)$ has the same properties, namely: if $f_z(t) > t$ at some point $t \in [0, 1]$ then $g_{z,\tau}(t) > t$ for all τ , and hence for all $t' < t$ and for all $\tau \in d\Psi_2$, $g_{z,\tau}(t') > t'$, and thus $f_z(t') > t'$ for all $t' \in [0, t]$. On the other hand, if $f_z(t) < t$ at $t \in [0, 1]$, then there must be some $\tau' \in d\Psi_2$ such that $g_{z,\tau'}(t) < t$. Hence $g_{z,\tau'}(t'') < t''$, for all $t'' \in [t, 1]$, and hence $f_z(t'') < t''$ for all $t'' \in [t, 1]$.

Next we prove the lemma for every $\varphi = h_\gamma$, where $\gamma \in \Gamma_2^u$. For every value of t , there is one SM strategy τ_t of player 2 (depending only on t) that minimizes simultaneously $g_{z,\tau}(t)$ for all nodes z . So $h_\gamma(t) = \min_{\tau} r_{\gamma,\tau}(t)$, where $r_{\gamma,\tau}(t) = \sum_{\gamma_1 \in \Gamma_1} p^{*,u,\sigma}(\gamma_1) g_{w(\gamma_1,\gamma),\tau}(t)$ is a convex combination (i.e., a “weighted average”) of some g functions at the same point t . The function $r_{\gamma,\tau}$ (for any subscript) inherits the same properties as the g ’s: continuous, differentiable, non-decreasing, with continuous non-decreasing derivatives, and $r_{\gamma,\tau}$ takes value between 0 and 1. As we argued for the g functions, in the same way it follows that $r_{\gamma,\tau}$ has properties 1 and 2. Also, as we argued for f ’s based on the g ’s, it follows that h ’s also have the same properties, based on the r ’s. \square

Let $t_1 = q_u^{*,\sigma}$, and let $t_2 = \text{Val}(A_u(q^{*,\sigma}))$. By assumption, $t_2 > t_1$. Observe that $f_z(t_1) = q_z^{*,\sigma}$ for every vertex z . Thus, $h_{\gamma_2}(t_1) = \sum_{\gamma_1 \in \Gamma_1} p^{*,u,\sigma}(\gamma_1) f_{w(\gamma_1,\gamma_2)}(t_1) = \sum_{\gamma_1} p^{*,u,\sigma}(\gamma_1) q_{w(\gamma_1,\gamma_2)}^{*,\sigma}$. But since, by definition, $p^{*,u,\sigma}$ is an optimal strategy for player 1 in the matrix game $A_u(q^{*,\sigma})$, it must be the case that for every $\gamma_2 \in \Gamma_2^u$, $h_{\gamma_2}(t_1) \geq t_2$, for otherwise player 2

could play a strategy against $p^{*,u,\sigma}$ which would force a payoff lower than the value of the game. Thus $h_{\gamma_2}(t_1) \geq t_2 > t_1$, for all γ_2 . This implies that $h_{\gamma_2}(t) > t$ for all $t < t_1$ by Lemma 2, and for all $t_1 \leq t < t_2$, because h_{γ_2} is non-decreasing. Thus, $h_{\gamma_2}(t) > t$ for all $t < t_2$.

Let $t_3 = q_u^{*,\sigma'}$. Let τ' be an optimal global strategy for player 2 against σ' ; by [16], we may assume τ' is a deterministic SM strategy. Let γ' be player 2's action in τ' at node u . Then the value of any node z under the pair of strategies σ' and τ' is $f_z(t_3)$, and thus since $h_{\gamma'}(t_3)$ is a weighted average of $f_z(t_3)$'s for some set of z 's, we have $h_{\gamma'}(t_3) = t_3$. Thus, by the previous paragraph, it must be that $t_3 \geq t_2$, and we know $t_2 > t_1$. Thus, $t_3 = q_u^{*,\sigma'} \geq \text{Val}(A_u(q^{*,\sigma})) > t_1 = q_u^{*,\sigma}$. We have shown:

Lemma 4.5. $q_u^{*,\sigma'} \geq \text{Val}(A_u(q^{*,\sigma})) > q_u^{*,\sigma}$.

Note that since $t_3 > t_1$, and f_z is non-decreasing, we have $f_z(t_3) \geq f_z(t_1)$ for all vertices z . But then $q_z^{*,\sigma'} = f_z(t_3) \geq f_z(t_1) = q_z^{*,\sigma}$ for all z . Thus, $q^{*,\sigma'} \geq q^{*,\sigma}$, with strict inequality at u , i.e., $q_u^{*,\sigma'} > q_u^{*,\sigma}$. Thus, we have established that such a “strategy improvement” step does yield a strictly better payoff for player 1.

Suppose we conduct this “strategy improvement” step repeatedly, starting at an arbitrary initial r-SM strategy σ_0 , as long as we can. This leads to a (possibly infinite) sequence of r-SM strategies $\sigma_0, \sigma_1, \sigma_2, \dots$. Suppose moreover, that during these improvement steps we always “prioritize” among vertices at which to improve so that, among all those vertices $u \in \text{Type}_{\text{play}}$ which can be improved, i.e., such that $q_u^{*,\sigma_i} < \text{Val}(A_u(q^{*,\sigma_i}))$, we choose the vertex which has not been improved for the longest number of steps (or one that has never been improved yet). This insures that, infinitely often, at every vertex at which the local strategy can be improved, it eventually is improved.

Under this strategy improvement regime, we show that $\lim_{i \rightarrow \infty} q^{*,\sigma_i} = q^*$, and thus, for all $\epsilon > 0$, there exists a sufficiently large $i \geq 0$ such that σ_i is an ϵ -optimal r-SM strategy for player 1. Note that after every strategy improvement step, i , which improves at a vertex u , by Lemma 4.5 we will have $q_u^{*,\sigma_{i+1}} \geq \text{Val}(A_u(q^{*,\sigma_i}))$. Since our prioritization assures that every vertex that can be improved at any step i will be improved eventually, for all $i \geq 0$ there exists $k \geq 0$ such that $q^{*,\sigma_i} \leq P(q^{*,\sigma_i}) \leq q^{*,\sigma_{i+k}}$. In fact, there is a uniform bound on k , namely $k \leq |Q|$, the number of vertices. This “sandwiching” property allows us to conclude that, in the limit, this sequence reaches a fixed point of $x = P(x)$. Note that since $q^{*,\sigma_i} \leq q^{*,\sigma_{i+1}}$ for all i , and since $q^{*,\sigma_i} \leq q^*$, we know that the limit $\lim_{i \rightarrow \infty} q^{*,\sigma_i}$ exists. Letting this limit be q' , we have $q' \leq q^*$. Finally, we have $q' = P(q')$, because letting i go to infinity in all three parts of the “sandwiching” inequalities above, we get $q' \leq \lim_{i \rightarrow \infty} P(q^{*,\sigma_i}) \leq q'$. But note that $\lim_{i \rightarrow \infty} P(q^{*,\sigma_i}) = P(q')$, because the mapping $P(x)$ is continuous on $\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^n$. Thus q' is a fixed point of $x = P(x)$, and $q' \leq q^*$. But since q^* is the *least* fixed point of $x = P(x)$, we have $q' = q^*$. \square

We have so far not addressed the complexity of computing or approximating the (ϵ -)optimal strategies for the two players in 1-RCSG termination games. Of course, in general, player 1 (maximizer) need not have any optimal strategies, so it only makes sense to speak about computing ϵ -optimal strategies for it. Moreover, the optimal strategies for player 2 may require randomization that is given by irrational probability distributions over moves, and thus we can not compute them exactly, so again we must be content to approximate them or answer decision questions about them. It is not hard to see however, by examining the proofs of our theorems, that such decision questions can be answered using queries to the existential theory of reals, and are thus also in PSPACE.

5. LOWER BOUNDS

Recall that the *square-root sum problem* (see, e.g., [20, 14]) is the following: given $(a_1, \dots, a_n) \in \mathbb{N}^n$ and $k \in \mathbb{N}$, decide whether $\sum_{i=1}^n \sqrt{a_i} \geq k$.

Theorem 5.1. *There is a P-time reduction from the square-root sum problem to the quantitative termination (decision) problem for finite CSGs.*

Proof. Given positive integers $(a_1, \dots, a_n) \in \mathbb{N}^n$, and $k \in \mathbb{N}$, we would like to check whether $\sum_{i=1}^n \sqrt{a_i} \geq k$. We can clearly assume that $a_i > 1$ for all i . We will reduce this problem to the problem of deciding whether for a given finite CSG, starting at a given node, the value of the termination game is greater than a given rational value.

Given a positive integer $a > 1$, we will construct a finite CSG, call it gadget $G(a)$, with the property that for a certain node u in $G(a)$ the value of the termination game starting at u is $d + e\sqrt{a}$, where d and e are rationals that depend on a , with $e > 0$, and such that we can compute d and e efficiently, in polynomial time, given a .

If we can construct such gadgets, then we can do the reduction as follows. Given $(a_1, \dots, a_n) \in \mathbb{N}^n$, with $a_i > 1$ for all i , and given $k \in \mathbb{N}$, make copies of the gadgets $G(a_1), \dots, G(a_n)$. In each gadget $G(a_i)$ we have a node u_i whose termination value is $d_i + e_i\sqrt{a_i}$, where d_i and $e_i > 0$ are rationals that depend on a_i and can be computed efficiently from a_i . Create a new node s and add transitions from s to the nodes u_i , $i = 1 \dots n$, with probabilities $p_i = E/e_i$, respectively, where $E = 1/(\sum_{i=1}^n \frac{1}{e_i})$. It is easy to check that the value of termination starting at s is $D + E \sum_{i=1}^n \sqrt{a_i}$, where $D = \sum_{i=1}^n p_i d_i$. Note that D and E are rational values that we can compute efficiently given the a_i 's, so to solve the square root sum problem, i.e., decide whether $\sum_{i=1}^n \sqrt{a_i} \geq k$, we can ask whether the value of the termination game starting at node s is $\geq D + Ek$.

Now we show how to construct the gadget $G(a)$ given a positive integer a . $G(a)$ has a play node u , the target node t , dead node z , and probabilistic nodes v_1, v_2 . Nodes z and t are absorbing. At u each player has two moves $\{1, 2\}$. If they play 1, 1 then u goes to v_1 , if they play 2, 2 then u goes to v_2 , if they play 1, 2 or 2, 1 then u goes to z .


Note that we can write a as $a = m^2 - l$ where m is a small-size rational (m is approximately \sqrt{a}) and $l < 1$ is also a small-size rational, and such that we can compute both m and l efficiently given a . To see this note that, first, given a we can easily approximate \sqrt{a} from above to within an additive error at most $1/(2a)$ in polynomial time, using standard methods for approximating square roots. In other words, given integer $a > 1$, we can efficiently compute a rational number m such that $0 \leq m - \sqrt{a} \leq 1/(2a)$. We then have

$$\begin{aligned} m^2 &\leq (\sqrt{a} + 1/(2a))^2 \\ &= a + 1/\sqrt{a} + 1/(4a^2) \end{aligned}$$

Since $1/\sqrt{a} + 1/(4a^2) < 1$, we can let $l = m^2 - a$.

Having computed m and l , let $c_2 = l/4$, $g = m - 1 - c_2$, and $c_1 = gc_3$, where $0 < c_3 < 1$ is a small-sized rational value such that $c_3 < 1/2g$. From node v_1 we move with probability c_1 to t , with probability c_2 to u , and with the remaining probability to z . From node v_2 we go with probability c_3 to t and $1 - c_3$ to z . It is not hard to check that these are legitimate probabilities.

Let x be the value at u . We have $x = \text{Val}(A)$, where the 2×2 matrix A for the one-shot zero-sum matrix game at u has $A_{1,1} = c_1 + c_2x$, $A_{2,2} = c_3$, and $A_{1,2} = A_{2,1} = 0$. Note that $A_{1,1} > 0$ and $A_{2,2} > 0$. If the optimal strategy of player 1 at u is to play 1 with probability p and 2 with probability $1 - p$, then by basic facts about zero-sum matrix games we must

Figure 2: 1-RMC A'

have $0 < p < 1$ and $x = p(c_1 + c_2x) = (1 - p)c_3$. So $p = c_3/(c_1 + c_2x + c_3)$, and substituting this expression for p in the equality $x = p(c_1 + c_2x)$, we have:

$$c_2x^2 + (gc_3 + c_3 - c_2c_3)x - g(c_3)^2 = 0$$

So,

$$x = \frac{-(gc_3 + c_3 - c_2c_3) + \sqrt{(gc_3 + c_3 - c_2c_3)^2 + 4gc_2(c_3)^2}}{2c_2}$$

Note that we must choose the root with $+$ sign to get a positive value.

The discriminant can be written as $(c_3)^2[(g + 1 - c_2)^2 + 4gc_2]$. The term $(c_3)^2$ will come out from under the square root, as c_3 , so we care only about the expression in the brackets, which is

$$\begin{aligned} (g + 1 - c_2)^2 + 4gc_2 &= (g + 1)^2 + (c_2)^2 - 2gc_2 - 2c_2 + 4gc_2 \\ &= (g + 1)^2 + (c_2)^2 + 2gc_2 + 2c_2 - 4c_2 \\ &= (g + 1 + c_2)^2 - 4c_2 \\ &= m^2 - l \\ &= a \end{aligned}$$

So $x = d + e\sqrt{a}$, where $d = -(gc_3 + c_3 - c_2c_3)/2c_2$ and $e = c_3/2c_2$. \square

Theorem 5.2. *There is a P-time reduction from the quantitative termination (decision) problem for finite CSGs to the qualitative termination problem for 1-RCSGs.*

Proof. Consider the 1-RMC depicted in Figure 2. We assume $p_1 + p_2 = 1$. As shown in ([14], Theorem 3), in this 1-RMC the probability of termination starting at $\langle \epsilon, en \rangle$ is 1 if and only if $p_2 \geq 1/2$.

Now, given a finite CSG, G , and a vertex u of G , do the following: first “clean up” G by removing all nodes where the min player (player 2) has a strategy to achieve probability 0. We can do this in polynomial time as follows. Note that the only way player 2 can force a probability 0 of termination is if it has a strategy τ such that, for all strategies σ of player 1, there is no path in the resulting Markov chain from the start vertex u to the terminal node. But this can only happen if, ignoring probabilities, player 2 can play in such a way as to avoid the terminal vertex. This can be checked easily in polynomial time.

The revised CSG will have two designated terminal nodes, the old terminal node, labeled “1”, and another terminal node labeled “0”. From every node v of $Type_{rand}$ in the revised CSG which does not carry full probability on its outedges, we direct all the “residual” probability to “0”, i.e., we add an edge from v to “0” with probability $p_{v,“0”} = 1 - \sum_w p_{v,w}$, where the sum is over all remaining nodes w in the CSG.

Let $\epsilon > 0$ be a value that is strictly less than the least probability, over all vertices, under any strategy for player 2, of reaching the terminal node. Obviously such an $\epsilon > 0$ exists in the revised CSG, because by Corollary 4.1 (specialized to the case of finite CSGs) player 2 has an optimal randomized S&M strategy. Fixing that strategy τ , player 1 can force termination from vertex u with positive probability $q_u^{*,\tau}$. We take $\epsilon = (\min_u q_u^{*,\tau})/2$. (We do not need to compute ϵ ; we only need its existence for the correctness proof of the reduction.)

In the resulting finite CSG, we know that if player 1 plays ϵ -optimally (which it can do with randomized S&M strategies), and player 2 plays arbitrarily, there is no bottom SCC in the resulting finite Markov chain other than the two designated terminating nodes “0” and “1”. In other words, all the probability exits the system, as long as the maximizing player plays ϵ -optimally.

Now, take the remaining finite CSG, call it G' . Just put a copy of G' at the entry of the component A_1 of the 1-RMC in Figure 2, identifying the entry en with the initial node, u , of G' . Take every transition that is directed into the terminal node “1” of G , and instead direct it to the exit ex of the component A_1 . Next, take every edge that is directed into the terminal “0” node and direct it to the first call port, (b_1, en) of the left box b_1 . Both boxes map to the unique component A_1 . Call this 1-RCSG A .

We now claim that the value $q_u^* \geq 1/2$ in the finite CSG G' for terminating at the terminal “1” iff the value $q_u^* = 1$ for terminating in the resulting 1-RCSG, A . The reason is clear: after cleaning up the CSG, we know that under an ϵ -optimal strategy for the maximizer for reaching “1”, all the probability exits G' either at “1” or at “0”. We also know that the supremum value that the maximizing player can attain will have value 1 iff the supremum probability it can attain for going directly to the exit of the component in A is $\geq 1/2$, but this is precisely the supremum probability that maximizer can attain for going to “1” in G' .

Lastly, note that the fact that the quantitative probability was taken to be $1/2$ for the finite CSG is without loss of generality. Given a finite CSG G and a rational probability p , $0 < p < 1$, it is easy to efficiently construct another finite CSG G' such that the termination probability for G is $\geq p$ iff the termination probability for G' is $\geq 1/2$. \square

6. CONCLUSIONS

We have studied Recursive Concurrent Stochastic Games (RCSGs), and we have shown that for 1-exit RCSGs with the termination objective we can decide both quantitative and qualitative problems associated with computing their values in PSPACE, using decision procedures for the existential theory of reals, whereas any substantial improvement (even to NP) of this complexity, even for their qualitative problem, would resolve a long standing open problem in exact numerical computation, namely the square-root sum problem. Furthermore, we have shown that the quantitative decision problem for finite-state concurrent stochastic games is also at least as hard as the square-root sum problem.

An important open question is whether approximation of the game values, to within a desired additive error $\epsilon > 0$, for both finite-state concurrent games and for 1-RCSGs, can be done more efficiently. Our lower bounds (with respect to square-root sum) do not address the approximation question, and it still remains open whether (a suitably formulated gap decision problem associated with) approximating the value of even finite-state CSGs, to within a given additive error $\epsilon > 0$, is in NP.

In [16], we showed that model checking linear-time (ω -regular or LTL) properties for 1-RMDPs (and thus also for 1-RSSGs) is undecidable, and that even the qualitative or approximate versions of such linear-time model checking questions remains undecidable. Specifically, for any $\epsilon > 0$, given as input a 1-RMDP and an LTL property, φ , it is undecidable to determine whether the optimal probability with which the controller can force (using its strategy) the executions of the 1-RMDP to satisfy φ , is probability 1, or is at most probability ϵ , even when we are guaranteed that the input satisfies one of these two cases. Of course these undecidability results extend to the more general 1-RCSGs.

On the other hand, building on our polynomial time algorithms for the qualitative termination problem for 1-RMDPs in [17], Brázdil et. al. [4] showed decidability (in P-time) for the qualitative problem of deciding whether there exists a strategy under which a given target vertex (which may not be an exit) of a 1-RMDP is reached in *any* calling context (i.e., under any call stack) almost surely (i.e., with probability 1). They then used this decidability result to show that the qualitative model checking problem for 1-RMDPs against a qualitative fragment of the branching time probabilistic temporal logic PCTL is decidable.

In the setting of 1-RCSGs (and even 1-RSSGs), it remains an open problem whether the qualitative problem of reachability of a vertex (in any calling context) is decidable. Moreover, it should be noted that even for 1-RMDPs, the problem of deciding whether the *value* of the reachability game is 1 is not known to be decidable. This is because although the result of [4] shows that it is decidable whether there exists a strategy that achieves probability 1 for reaching a desired vertex, there may not exist any optimal strategy for this reachability problem, in other words the value may be 1 but it may only be attained as the supremum value achieved over all strategies.

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